To be added:
Cosmic Life Line
Sci Study of UFOs
Philosophy of Science
AbuTaha's reports on the
Challenger accident are rather extensive, and the original reports will be added
to this webpage later. Some photos showing unique events can be found in the
messages posted on www.collectspace.com
(see below). Other photos and video clips of unique events, that were completely
overlooked in all other studies of the accident, will also be added later. These
will include clear evidence of the Challenger Crew Cabin after the explosion,
the failure of the O-ring seal joint eight-seconds after lift-off, etc. If you
are familiar with the Challenger investigations record, you might want to look
for, and identify, the dramatic evidence yourself.
I developed a completely different “sequence of
events” for Challenger from lift-off to, and beyond, the explosion that we
all saw on television. There were many unique events that were missed in all
the other investigations. The important events are supported with clear
evidence. One event was the real Challenger Crew Cabin (CCC) tumbling far
away from all the other debris after the explosion.
In 1986, I discovered that what NASA identified as the
CCC after the explosion, in the films, was a piece of debris, and I also
captured the real Crew Cabin in the film record. I showed the evidence to a
distinguished member of the Rogers Commission, officers from NASA, and
others. The subject was emotionally charged then. Everyone thought it better
not to release my finding publicly, and I agreed - - -
In the case of the space program, as in the case of the
economy and other vital national issues, the Obama Administration was dealt
a fold hand: Seat belts designed with wrong evidence for vehicles
that don’t exist.
- - -TSTO will have “a substantial performance margin
to offset weight gains typically experienced…” Why start with a
performance margin only to offset inevitable weight gains? Why the habitual
practice: design it, construct it, test it to find out what will fail,
redesign it, reconstruct it, redesign, reconstruct, etc.? Why not design it
right the first time? Why not construct it right the first time?
For nearly seven years now (1986-1993), I have cautioned that
we continue on the above path, then we are not going to Mars, we are not
going back to the moon, and we will hardly make it to low earth orbit;
which is where we are today. (Compare this with the present situation in
What’s wrong with the space program? William Harwood
quotes an unidentified NASA manager, (Space News, August 30, 1993, p.1), “Something
isn’t right, and I don’t know what the heck it is.” This is as
spontaneous as it can get.
The article offers potential answers: "bad
luck," "some generic management problem," "the way the
government manages critical contracts," "the nation's reluctance
to accept risk," "sophisticated [though unidentified] failures,"
"putting all its [NASA] eggs in one basket," "the
agency's ability to monitor the work of contractors." These are not
causes of technical failures. Not even budgets can explain what's going on.
The Congress will reconvene soon and ask: What's wrong?
Sieff and Ross note that Vaughan is not an expert. Early in her book,
Vaughan admitted that she initially thought the O-rings to operate like a
“Nurf ball.” It takes guts to admit that. The rest of her book shows
that she eventually thoroughly understood the nuances of the infamous
joints. How do I know? I did many analyses and tests of joint rotation in
the early 1970s, long before NASA discovered the effect in the boosters
The following messages were posted on collectSpace in 2007.
Some of the postings contain photos of unique events that were overlooked in the
other Challenger Studies. You can find the complete colloquy on www.collectspace.com.
Hello Mr. Pearlman and everyone. This is Ali AbuTaha (#101).
years ago, someone told me that rude remarks were made about my work and me on
the net. I checked it out and decided not to dignify the ill informed, ill
qualified and ill-mannered folks, though they belonged to respectable
organizations, with answers. I had not heard from Tim Furniss for a number of
years and I was happy to hear about his book and his Chapter 10 on the
Challenger investigations. I respect Tim for caring about our American space
program as if it were his own...
This is Ali AbuTaha again (#102)
now, I have read your postings, navigated collectSpace, and I congratulate you
on a professional forum. Forgive me for offending some of you, a natural
reaction to attacks. I attribute the present situation to meager hard evidence
about my work in your hand.
do you double thrust? I had shown that the nearly doubled loads of the dynamic
overshoot hit the Shuttle hard on every mission. Wow! Can the effect be turned
into use? Tim wrote about this in Flight, “Pulsing engines could boost
Shuttle loads,” September 1992. As Tim reported, I intended to “clamp”
and “rectify” FORCE pulses to double the thrust, just as has been done
with the “voltage doublers” in electronics many years ago. Anyone who took
an introductory electronics course should know about “clamping” and
“rectifying” a signal.
“mjanovec.” This is the most valuable post so far as it steers the
discussion in the right direction. In my present circumstances, this may be
the best thing to happen. The other photos in the Commission Report, pp.
34-35, are also relevant to my comments below. That’s exactly my point, the
piece marked “Crew Cabin” in the photo is not the Crew Cabin.
nearly 20 years, here is a modest effort and hopefully useful information.
Thank you Hawaii, “Rizz.” One of my projects
in the beautiful State in 1975 or 76 helped me to find the Challenger fire at
brightness of the day, intensity of plumes and white colors saturated the
cameras. By simply filtering the glow effect, the intense fire became vividly
visible. I took pictures of these. The BIS photos mentioned before are shown
the dynamic overshoot problem not been partially corrected for, albeit
fortuitously, then fatal accidents would have been the rule, rather than the
following is about the SRB joint that did not rotate and, hence, was not the
likely cause of the Challenger accident.
only the arrows showing the direction of preload with certainty resulted
from my work, then it was all worth it. A loose or overly tightened strut
could spell disaster. I might add that I had experience with similar simple
mistakes, which almost led to serious disasters in different systems.
Mr. Pearlman and some of you
have raised legitimate concerns regarding the validity of my engineering
position, e.g., Day’s
in a peer-reviewed journal and I’ll take this seriously - - -
effort ended with a plea from a distinguished space authority, Wilbur
Pritchard, whose credentials in transient analysis were impeccable. From a
previous post, he wrote in April 1992,
this point, in view of the importance of the issue and in recognition of Mr.
Ali AbuTaha’s respectable credentials as a member of the space fraternity,
this paper should be published - - -
Galileo had experience with the “horses,” that Professor Covert
spoke about above, when he writes in The Assayer:
reasoning were like hauling I should agree that several reasoners would be
worth more than one, just as several horses can haul more sacks of grain
than one can. But reasoning is like racing and not like hauling, and a
single Arabian steed can outrun a hundred plowhorses - - -
had actually found one of my old Challenger photo albums and began to post
some photos on this thread, e.g., the fire below and through the right wing at
lift-off. The process was interrupted.
the same page, the “minimum reusability design objectives” for the
Redesigned SRM are given at “19 reuses.” Soon after McDonald’s paper in
the learned journal, booster segments on Atlantis failed – badly – after 1
(one) use. I urge Hansen to read my shuttlefactor report.
From the sequence you see above, it is evident that the stricken right booster
on Challenger was leaking hot gases throughout flight. If you only saw the New
Smyrna Beach tape from T+71s (Photo #5), you could easily conclude that all
was well. For example, you might think there were two boosters and you see two
plumes, i.e., the plume on the right belongs to the left booster and the left
plume belongs to the stricken right SRB. Not so. After T+71 seconds (Photo
#5), the plume on the right belongs to both the left and right
SRBs (the main
plume) and the plume on the left is a third plume – the leak trail- - -
A picture is worth a
thousand words, and here is such a picture. I had taken a close-up of the
40-second event (Photo #6); and the average of measurements made by the
engineers attending my Challenger course at the George Washington University
was 10-degrees. You can measure the angle that Challenger made at T+40s
directly from my photo with a simple protractor. Is
it that simple? Yes. The
Shuttle is driven through its center of gravity. When the nozzles turn, the
stack turns on a dime, more like a London Cab than a New York Taxi.
T+50 and T+60 seconds, only one major event is listed in the official “STS
51-L Sequence of Major Events,” (Commission, Vol. I, p. 37): The
appearance of “flame on RH SRM” at T+58.788 seconds. Yet for the same
interval, I had discovered numerous “Major Events” as described below.
posted by kyra:
this be timed to the classic launch video where the cameras temporarily lose
focus for a second or so?
This is the first time in 21 years
someone makes direct connection between the NSB photo events and the focus
loss in the TV-feed video. Many people discussed the loss of focus in the
continuous coverage on the day of the accident and afterwards. There is
correlation, but one must first gather all relevant data.
NASA, and NACA before, pioneered the study and
photography of shock waves. We used to hunt for shock wave pictures hoping to
better understand the complex equations and analysis of supersonic flight.
Around June 1987, NASA released a summary videotape of the official Challenger
investigation. The narrator said that NASA looked for a “shock wave” from
the main explosion that broke the assembly apart, but couldn’t find one. I
had found the shock wave that the investigators couldn’t find. My photo and
its significance are described here.
is a bit off subject, though necessary, and I hope our Moderator will tolerate
As an educator, I
feel obligated to make valuable information available to others, particularly
young people who might be inspired to do greater things in their lives and the
lives of others. It is in that spirit that I took the time to prepare the
lengthy posts, and to give a synopsis, answer questions, post photos and
specific challenges, and defend myself against thoughtless attacks. As you can
see from the above list of works, I really must return to work soon. But I
look forward to post relevant messages and answer questions.
"I am really aghast at Ali's statement that Conservation of Energy may
be invalid. Tell me more."
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