To be added:
Cosmic Life Line
Sci Study of UFOs
Philosophy of Science
The “dynamic overshoot” saga was gruesome (see Shuttlefactor webpage). At
one point, someone from the Office of Vice President Dan Quayle asked AbuTaha,
“Can this “dynamic overshoot” be turned into something useful, like an
invention?” “Actually, there is more than one invention in the
concept,” answered AbuTaha. Months later, he called VP Quayle’s office
to tell them that he invented a method, which he called “Pulsing Thrust,” to
“double” the thrust of rocket engines and motors; and that the invention
was based on the “dynamic overshoot” ideas. The VP Office told
AbuTaha to take it to NASA. He had already taken it to NASA and DOD. The administrator then, Dan Goldin, referred the invention to a propulsion manager, William Escher. After a
rough start, the “Pulsing Thrust” made it to the NASA Lewis Research Center
(LeRC) in Ohio. Captain Neil Roble from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB)
requested, and received, a long briefing on “dynamic overshoot,” “pulsing
thrust,” and AbuTaha’s lengthy mathematical analysis of the thermodynamics,
propulsion, physics, and mechanics of the invention. Then hundreds of pages were
faxed to Phillips Laboratory (PL) at Edwards AFB, Space Command, LeRC and
As the sole inventor of the method to ”double” the specific impulse, isp,
of engines, AbuTaha expected “sole source procurement” with DOD and NASA.
That was the Law. Sole source procurement means that you, and only you, submit
initial proposals for the work. Everyone was agreeable. AbuTaha was invited to
go to Edwards, and he expected invitations to WPAFB, LeRC and other Centers.
Then, out of the blue, Robert Corley, from Phillips Laboratory at Edwards
called AbuTaha on July 6, 1993. Everything was canceled. All arrangements were
canceled. Why? Corley, the Chief Scientist at Phillips, said that “response
from engineers” was “fundamentally same response as NASA.”
Corley went on to say that in his 30 years experience, he “never found a
failure” attributed to the dynamic overshoot effect! He concluded the
telecon with the words, “I hope this conversation is adequate. Sorry!”
AbuTaha made a few calls. The engineers who received details of his invention at WP, Edwards and LeRC were still onboard. He called Corley on July 9, 1993. Corley refused to send anything in writing about his telecon. He told AbuTaha that if DOD pursued the subject, it would be “competitive procurement,” and AbuTaha would have to compete for the contract like everyone else. Dr. Corley did not know that AbuTaha gave lectures on defense and aerospace procurement to military personnel in the early 1980s. AbuTaha cited exact civil and military Codes that give the inventor the right to “sole source procurement.” Corley was not expecting this, and he dropped a bombshell, explaining his real reasons for canceling the above arrangements. He said that he checked with NASA and discovered that AbuTaha’s “transient” studies were all “nonsense,” and on the “pulsing thrust” method, Corley said that you “can’t get more than 100%,” and other things. The real damaging words from Corley were the accusation that there was “a Court Order to keep you (AbuTaha) away from MSFC (Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama). Neil Young fared better in Alabama. The NASA MSFC deep throat in Huntsville struck again.
A scathing telex from MSFC to KSC in October 1986 led to the cancellation of a Purchase Order agreement between NASA and AbuTaha to do the dynamic overshoot transient analysis. A scathing letter to Dr. Stephen Trachtenberg, the President of the George Washington University, from MSFC in 1989 led to the cancellation of AbuTaha’s course on the Challenger Accident, the cancellation of a coast-to-coast telecast on Cold Fusion, and the cancellation of a 3-day Cold Fusion Program. And now, the NASA MSFC phantom was at it again.
What NASA did, and did not do, after Corley's shocking accusation demands explanation. The facts are presented here to Corley, and everyone from PL, WP, Space Command, the Pentagon, NASA, GWU, defense and aerospace Contractors and others. The meetings AbuTaha held at KSC in October 1986 were portrayed by someone(s) from MSFC as AbuTaha crashing into the Cape and getting caught and exposed by MSFC. This is blatantly false, and Richard Truly and Dan Goldin should have struck down the false accusations during their tenure at NASA, but they didn't.
The facts, in the possession of NASA and the Courts, show the following:
(1) AbuTaha’s visit to KSC was arranged by astronaut Bonnie Dunbar, who was
assigned to interface with him by Admiral Richard Truly, then NASA Associate
Administrator, (2) A Congressional Science and Technology Committee asked
AbuTaha to witness the Atlantis rollout, (3) AbuTaha personally briefed an
assistant to General James Abrahamson, then Director of SDIO, on the transient
dynamic overshoot effect in the Space Shuttle and defense systems before going to
the Cape, and (4) AbuTaha’s primary objective at the Cape was to check out the
“damping” measures that some engineers claimed to exist on the Shuttle to
counter the lift-off transient “dynamic overshoot” forces. He had challenged
that claim by NASA engineers while still in Washington. It turned out that the
"damping" measures the NASA engineers claimed had nothing whatsoever
to do with the lift-off dynamic overshoot, and AbuTaha's trip to KSC was very
productive. At the Cape and as
required, a NASA escort accompanied AbuTaha at all times and meetings. As was
his practice in all missions to secured centers before, he was completely
compliant with all laws. AbuTaha was not at KSC for a 3-hour in-and-out dash.
Over a period of 3-days at KSC, he had productive meetings with several teams.
visit to KSC culminated in a large meeting headed by the Space Shuttle Engineering
Director and attended by MSFC’s Representative at KSC. The “dynamic
overshoot” mistake in the Space Shuttle was clearly established in the meeting
using actual Shuttle lift-off data. There were about 15 senior engineers in
the meeting, all of them were involved in the Space Shuttle for years, and not
one of them expressed dissent over the "dynamic overshoot" evidence. That was the basis
for the Purchase Order agreement with NASA mentioned above.
But, Corley did not want to hear any of it telling AbuTaha, "I know the
people I spoke with at NASA."
But, Corley did not want to hear any of it telling AbuTaha, "I know the people I spoke with at NASA."
AbuTaha called the offices of the Administrator, Associate Administrators, IG (inspector general), GC (General Counsel); he called and met with admirals and generals he knew, he tried the Offices of his legislators from Virginia, Senator John Warner and Congressman Frank Wolf, and others. No results. Escher from NASA said that he was "unaware of any negative reactions" about AbuTaha or his Invention. Captain Neil Roble and the Commander at Edwards said that they sent written recommendation about the pulsing thrust invention to Space Command. But, no one could reverse Corley’s call.
The only thing that resulted
from the flurry of activities was a letter of denial from the NASA General
Counsel Office, dated July 20, 1993, stating,
The letter was useless. Robert C. Corley is a distinguished propulsion expert and leader, recognized
by aerospace communities, and AbuTaha did not name Corley as the source of the
allegation. AbuTaha had heard similar allegations in the 1980s and he dismissed
them as innuendo. But coming from Corley, the allegation carried
more weight, hence, the complaint to NASA.
Then on August 27, 1993, the Dan Goldin’s NASA General Counsel Office sent
AbuTaha a letter requesting termination of all communications with the agency:
Around this time, the NASA engineers (including, Dr. Mike McGowan at LeRC in
Ohio and others) were beginning to realize that AbuTaha's "thrust
doubling" technique was credible, and not "trash" as they had
insinuated for a long year. Did Dan Goldin know that AbuTaha's pulsing thrust
method was credible when NASA dismissed AbuTaha? Did the General Counsel know
that "thrust doubling" is real? Did Goldin and the General Counsel
consider reversing their Order when the Air Force issued solicitation to
"double" the thrust of rocket motors and engines only four months
later? During Goldin’s tenure at NASA, the Air Force began to work on
AbuTaha’s invention to double (200%) the thrust or exceed the
"impossible" 100% barrier. Then, Air Force and NASA collaboration on AbuTaha’s
Invention was established. The Invention would be described as “world-class.” The aerospace contractors, professional organizations and universities
were brought into the collaboration to move the Invention forward to the
benefit of our defense, space program, economy, and education. At no time did
Goldin, Corley, or others who knew full well that AbuTaha was the first and sole
inventor of the method to double thrust would invite him to participate or send him a simple
apology, thank you, or recognition note for his Invention.
First, here are some of AbuTaha's write-ups on his "Pulsing Thrust," or "Thrust-Doubler," Invention, including the Patent Application that he filed with the USPTO on September 9, 1992.
Sensible Way to Space - 35 Years Late
for Substantial Increase in Effective Thrust
A method comprising the application of thrust in rocket engines and motors in sequential short-pulses to maximize or magnify the effect of the applied forces, by up to 100% in the ideal case; where each pulse is of sufficiently long duration to produce the maximum or desired transient magnification effect, which is also known as the dynamic overshoot; and where the pulses are applied with sufficient frequency to rectify the thrust, or force, near the peak dynamic overshoot value before the magnification effect is lost to other forms of unusable energy, such as, heat.
and The Second Law of Thermodynamics
on Pulsing Thrust
familiar with procurement of defense and aerospace systems would instantly
recognize Robert Corley’s unreasonable, and even wrong, attitude described
above. To submit sole-source proposal, Corley invoked another ridiculous
requirement. He insisted that AbuTaha must submit a “refereed paper” with any
proposal. Anyone familiar with “refereed papers” will deduce that either
Corley was vehemently opposed to the possibility of “doubling” the thrust
(in July 1993), or he had
Everyone AbuTaha dealt with from WP, PL, Space Command, Lewis, and other
Centers was professional and polite. Corley's actions remain incomprehensible to
this day (2009).
Everyone AbuTaha dealt with from WP, PL, Space Command, Lewis, and other Centers was professional and polite. Corley's actions remain incomprehensible to this day (2009).
to Lt Col Mike Heil
a last ditch effort, AbuTaha met with the Director of Advanced Technology
R&E, Donald Dix, at the Pentagon on September 20, 1993. As far as Dix was
concerned, there was no “dynamic overshoot” effect. The NASA engineers who
measured the effect from actual Space Shuttle lift-off were probably
"idiots." And 100% (one hundred percent) was the limit to the
performance of engines and motors. Our space program, AbuTaha thought, was in
for a long winter night.
all major aerospace contractors responded to AbuTaha, most negatively. Without
consulting with AbuTaha, one major Contractor put an engine on a rack, set the
engine pulsing, and reported to AbuTaha no improvement. AbuTaha had given
details of the invention only to the folks at Edwards AFB, Wright-Patterson AFB
and NASA Lewis Research Center. To get the thrust advantage, one must "pulse"
the engine, "clamp" the pulse, and then "rectify" the
repeated pulses. “Clamp” and “rectify” signals are common speak in
electronics. In propulsion, no one knew what “clamp” and “rectify”
pulses meant. That was the heart of AbuTaha’s Invention (see patent
application and other write-ups above).
the end of 1993, the Phillips Laboratory at Edward Air Force Base released
Program Solicitation 94.1, titled, Advanced Rocket Propulsion Technology:
DOD Solicitation 94.1 (FY 1994)
It is not clear when Corley became a convert to "Thrust Doubling." In AbuTaha's opinion, the solicitation was written for someone else. He did not submit a proposal. Corley would probably state indignantly, the solicitation was out there and AbuTaha could have responded like everyone else. AbuTaha earned "sole source solicitation" opportunity as the record shows. The PL's, or Corley's, Solicitation, did NOT ask for "refereed papers." This webpage should remind the distinguished Robert Corley and others who was the first and sole inventor of the method to "DOUBLE" thrust.
In 2004, President George W. Bush announced a vision for space exploration (VSE) to go back to the Moon, on to Mars, and Beyond. A Presidential Commission was formed to look into it: The President’s Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, which also became known as the President’s Commission on Moon, Mars and Beyond; or Moon to Mars (MtM). The Commission was headed by Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge, and it held hearings in different major cities and listened to an incredibly large number of people from all over the Country and the World. The Commission listened to experts on education, industry, economy, space, and the military. On March 3 and 4, 2004, the Commission held hearings at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) in Ohio.
Ten years after the top propulsion and aerospace experts from NASA and elsewhere proudly dismissed AbuTaha’s invention to “double” the specific impulse of rocket engines and motors, the subject came up in the Aldridge Hearings – in Ohio. By now, AbuTaha's invention had a new name: the Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion System (IHPRP). And by now, his invention was a joint collaboration between NASA and the Air Force. In the Science and Technology Sessions, the Aldridge Commission Reports states:
AbuTaha watched all the sessions of the Aldridge Commission. Many great people spoke and many great ideas were presented. One subject stood out above all the others; that was the reports from the Air Force that they had successfully exceeded the 100% thrust level and were now trying to achieve the 200% (double) thrust advantage described in this webpage. Here are some excerpts from the Commission's proceedings.
And so, there it was, AbuTaha's "Pulsing Thrust" Invention to double the thrust of engines and motors. But as one can tell from the above briefs, or from the full Aldridge commission record, AbuTaha did not exist, did not invent, did not struggle to advance the national security, defense, space program, economy, education, or World leadership. No one was there to boast, to brag, to show off. Or, was there? Col. Joe Boyle made an impressive presentation. Boyle did not claim to invent "doubling" the thrust. He honestly referred that to anonymous "folks" who "do revolutionary kind of things." Who are those folks who do revolutionary kind of things? Do they have "unrestricted intellectual property rights" to AbuTaha's invention? Who invented the thrust "doubling" method? Was it Robert Corley, William Escher, Mike McGowan, or, someone else who took the invention from AbuTaha? Col. Boyle boasted about the world-class work that he and his colleagues were doing. Everyone was happy to hear Boyle say those words. AbuTaha was too. Boyle described other great achievements that he and his teams achieved, other than just the "doubling" of thrust.
In its Report to the President, the Commission said that it “strongly support the Centennial Challenge established by NASA. This program provides… for the payment of cash prizes for advancement of space or aeronautical technologies…" Only ten years earlier, doubling the thrust sounded worse than inventing the perpetual machine. Was anyone rewarded for the invention? Who? When? And, how much?
The Aldridge Commission wanted to hear from everyone.
On the basis of everything described above, AbuTaha couldn't resist the temptation to write to the Aldridge Commission to rightfully "boast" that he was the first and sole inventor of the "world-class" Thrust Doubler. There was a slight chance the Commission might right the wrongs of the past.
AbuTaha also proposed to share other significant achievements with the Commission [same subjects described in AbuTaha's 2009 Letter to NSF - see STEMnP webpage]. The Commission did not answer.
In an email message to the NASA Administrator, Sean O'Keefe, dated August 23, 2003, AbuTaha requested that the "10-year old instruction from NASA" not to communicate with anyone in the agency be reversed. O'Keefe did not reply.
AbuTaha sent another email to Richard A. Howell, NASA Assistant General Counsel, on September 6, 2005
Howell's response, less than half-an-hour later on September 6, 2005, was a brief half-liner, dry as crisp bacon:
Anyway, "AbuTaha’s Pulsing Thrust = IHPRP;" that NASA and Phillips first ridiculed as impossible in 1992-93, walked away with in 1994, and boasted about as their world-class invention for a decade.
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